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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, Geachte collega’s, Dames en Heren,
Since the beginning of 2008, world economies have suffered from 
strong financial strains, producing the collapse of the real estate market 
in the United States, the destabilization of the international banking 
system (e.g., the financial distress of Northern Rock and the bankruptcy 
of several US banks1), the downward trend of world stock markets and a 
general pessimism in many economic agents. As is usual in such a case, 
numerous alarmist articles have been published in the press, announc-
ing the big wave that would definitively kill or at least seriously injure 
our capitalist world. For example, the Financial Times published, on 
January 22, 2008, an article by George Soros describing the recent crisis 
as the worst one in 60 years. This statement was immediately reinforced 
by the chairperson of the Soros Fund Management, who added, “[t]he 
danger is that the resulting political tensions, including US protection-
ism, may disrupt the global economy and plunge the world into reces-
sion or worse.”
When looking back at the history of economics, it appears that finan-
cial turmoil has always existed. Kindelberger (2000) has provided an 
exhaustive list of the crises that have hit the world’s economies begin-
ning with the famous “tulip mania” episode. It was the first speculative 
attack, on the tulip market in Haarlem around 1636, leaving the Dutch 
government in serious trouble for financing the Thirty Years War. 
It is also obvious that financial crises have had a strong and deep 
impact on public management and, more generally, on economic theory. 
The origin of modern macroeconomic theory is generally associated 
with the publication of “The General Theory and Employment, Interest 
and Money” by John Maynard Keynes in 1936. In reaction to the Great 
Depression and its disastrous consequences for the world’s economies 
(unemployment and deflation in particular) in the early 1930’s, Keynes 
provided justification for government’s intervention, designing macro-
economics as the framework for defining optimal instruments to cure 
the real effects of a crisis (unemployment and deflation in particular) 
and, more generally, any disequilibrium. Hence, in the aftermath of the 
Keynesian rupture, the role of the economist has changed from that of a 
neutral observer, analyzing the adjustments of prices and goods on the 
market and, in the end, advocating for a “laissez-faire” policy, to that of 
a more active player, who should optimally intervene immediately. It is 
worth mentioning that this active role of the economist has motivat-
several generations of students, one of which I belong to.
1 When this inaugural lecture was written, seven US banks had liquidity problem in 2008.
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Financial crises have also highlighted the obligation of macro-eco-
nomics to international efforts. The last 50 years have seen a tremen-
dous rise in the economic and financial links of economies. This evolu-
tion is mainly due to the strong decrease in trade tariffs, which used to 
be the traditional tool for protectionism. In the aftermath of the Bretton 
Woods agreement, which formed the basis of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) (now called the World Trade Organization) 
and the numerous regional agreements (such as the Maastricht Treaty 
for European countries), capital controls have been almost fully removed 
around the world. Similarly, trade tariffs have turned out to be much 
lower than they were before the Second World War. This process, often-
labeled “globalization,” has had severe consequences for financial crises 
and the design of optimal macroeconomic policies to cure them. In par-
ticular, financial crises are no longer bound to a particular country but 
are transmitted worldwide at a greater pace. The recent Asian crisis is 
an interesting example of such a phenomenon, often called contagion. 
A shock occurring in Thailand is transmitted to the whole Asian area 
within the same year. Consequently, an optimal reaction should not be 
national but should be coordinated at a regional level or, even better, at 
the world level and rely on the institutions composing the International 
Monetary System. 
The field covered by International Monetary Economics is vast. It runs 
from the analysis of financial crises to their transmission, the design 
of optimal macroeconomic policies, the organization of international 
financial structure, trade analysis and so on. Different methodological 
approaches can also be considered: using theoretical (static or dynamic) 
models and institutional perspectives or opting for an empirical perspec-
tive and implementing the tools recently proposed by econometrics 
(time series, panels). The diversity of these approaches could constitute 
an obstacle for a research agenda, as different approaches may lead 
to unconcealed conclusions. Nevertheless, even if I confess my prefer-
ence for empirical work using current econometric tools, reconciling 
and linking these approaches strikes me as a motivating challenge, as 
it leads to a better understanding and a more efficient macroeconomic 
management. This lecture could thus take several hours or even days. I 
have decided to remain silent on certain research topics and to focus—
as the title of the lecture indicates—on financial crises. I will adopt the 
Keynesian economic perspective, acting as an emergency doctor deal-
ing with a patient (the world economy) who is facing a serious disease 
Oratie  Prof. dr. Bertrand Candelon 7
(financial crises). The analogy to medicine is straightforward in the case of 
financial crisis, especially if one remembers the name given to the recent 
crises: the Asian flu or the Russian cold. Moreover, I find this metaphor fits 
quite well this new chair at the University of Maastricht, which was creat-
ed 30 years ago for the study of medicine. Moreover, medicine has always 
held a clear interest for me and would perhaps have been my career 
choice, were it not for the fact that I feel faint at the sight of blood.
The symptoms
As you know, a competent medical doctor always begins an exami-
nation with a description of the symptoms of the disease. The features 
corresponding to the financial crisis have thus to be specified. Checking 
the famous Wikipedia encyclopedia, we read that a financial crisis is 
characterized by a “situation” in which “money demand quickly rises 
relative to money supply.” This definition turns out to be oversimplified, 
but presents the advantage of stressing two important features: First, 
financial turmoil is a temporary episode (“situation”). Second, it implies 
a problem of a lack of liquidity. To find a more detailed theoretical defi-
nition we refer to a lecture at the World Bank in 2003 given by Frederic 
Mishkin. He defines a financial crisis as “nonlinear disruption, during 
which financial markets are unable to channel funds to those with the 
most productive investment opportunities.” Even if this definition may 
appear a little bit esoteric for a non-specialist, it stresses other impor-
tant characteristics of a financial crisis: First, financial crises may affects 
several financial markets at the same time: We all have in mind that the 
recent 1997 Asian crisis primarily affected the exchange rate market (the 
collapse of the Thai Baht), whereas the recent subprime crisis disturbed 
the real estate market. More generally, we can consider financial crises 
either independently or simultaneously affecting the foreign exchange, 
equity, bonds, real estate, or debt markets. Second, the banking sector 
may also play a role in the origin and/or transmission of the crisis, as it is 
an intermediary per se to finance investments. For example, the subprime 
crisis of 2008 has increased the fragility of the banking sector, due to the 
strong depreciation of real property assets. The situations of Northern 
Rock or Bear Stearns, which were close to bankruptcy, constitute perfect 
illustrations of this fact. Finally, financial crises are characterized by jumps 
(“nonlinear disruptions”), also called speculative attacks. This indicates 
that, at a particular moment, agents or speculators all decide to sell their 
holdings in order to obtain liquidity, leading to an abrupt change in the 
assets’ prices. 
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Even if these definitions provide us with a better understanding of 
the concept of financial crises, an operational rule that will help the 
economist doctor to determine if economies are facing a crisis still has 
to be defined. 
We can start by looking at Figure 1, representing the daily evolution 
of the Dow Jones, the CAC 40, and the FTSE100, three well-known global 
indices of the New York, Paris, and London Stock Exchanges, respectively. 
Global indices represent a weighted average of the shares of a large 
number of firms from all sectors of the economy. They should thus sig-
nal that a financial crisis is occurring, whatever the market involved. The 
left panel of Figure 1 reports the evolution of the indices, whereas the 
right one reports the return (growth rate) of the stock indices. From the 
series in levels, it is hardly possible to detect speculative attacks, except 
perhaps in 2001 or 1997. Instead, it is noticeable that stock markets are 
subject to recurrent periods of “bulls” and “bears.”2 Typically, they can 
be associated with speculative bubbles (e.g., the dot.com bubble that 
affected the high technology sector during the 1990’s), indicating that 
the stock index deviates from its fundamental price. Nevertheless, in no 
way can they be the signal of a financial crisis, since the explosion of the 
bubble turns out to be linear and not characterized by jumps.3
The analysis of the returns is more interesting. The variations at the 
beginning of the sample are predominant and to correspond to the 1987 
crash. You can see that stock markets show volatility clusters (with huge 
variation) around 2001 and 2007. Nevertheless, it is not possible to fix 
an a priori threshold beyond which excess volatility would indicate the 
occurrence of a crisis. Moreover, the so-called financial crisis that was 
supposed to have hit the world in January 2008 is difficult to detect. 
Even if stock market data are used in many studies, they may not 
be fully adequate to detecting the tension that may occur on one par-
ticular market during a financial crisis. We can now analyze the most 
adequate indicator of a financial crisis market by market.
2 See Candelon, Piplack and Straetmans (2008) for recent work on this topic. 
3 Some authors call this phenomenon a “long-term crash,” but this terminology seems  
 inadequate and in opposition with the theoretical definition of a crisis, which has to be  
 of both sudden onset and limited in time.
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Figure 1:  
Stock exchange indices (weekly frequency extracted from DataStream).
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Currency crisis
To better understand the functioning of the exchange rate mar-
kets that determine the relative value of a currency vis a vis others, it 
is necessary to go back to the end of the Second World War In 1944, 
when the victorious countries signed the Bretton Woods treaty, which 
aimed at reorganizing the International Monetary System in order to 
avoid major financial disequilibria such as the 1929 financial crisis. To 
oversimplify the message of the treaty, all the currencies were set to 
have a fixed parity, and the countries’ central banks could use as reserve 
currencies either the USD or gold (the convertibility between USD and 
gold being guaranteed by the US government at a fixed rate of $35 per 
ounce). Additionally, a new international organization, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), was created to ensure the smooth functioning of 
this new system. 
The choice was made for a fixed parity system in order to pro-
vide the international monetary system with credibility and stability: 
Hence, an investor could choose the market in which to invest, without 
having to consider the potential loss in terms of currency depreciation. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, it forced the countries to condition their 
internal goals (unemployment, inflation, etc) to the satisfaction of this 
external constraint. 
The exchange rate system designed by the Bretton Woods Treaty was 
characterized by the fixity of the exchange rate system, but in an asym-
metric way. The United States was designated as the country possessing 
the international reserve currency. The gold supply being limited, it was 
expected that the demand for USD would grow. Moreover, the United 
States, as the leader of the International Monetary system, was in a way 
obliged to provide the other countries with enough liquidity to finance 
the cost of the war. Japan, Germany, and some European countries bene-
fited from the Marshall Plan to rebuild their destroyed infrastructure. 
The United States had the privilege of printing money to satisfy their 
internal goals (mainly in terms of unemployment) without taking care 
of the potential repercussions on other currencies. In the case of per-
sistent disequilibrium (i.e. when the fixed exchange rate is constantly 
over- or under-valued, or characterized by an in or outflow of reserves 
in the balance sheet of the central bank), the IMF should intervene by 
imposing adjustments (re- or devaluate) to reach the adequate parity 
between the currencies under scope. 
As Mr. Triffin noted, the international reserve role played by the US 
dollar itself contains the roots of its collapse. Indeed, since the US is in 
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charge of the liquidity of the International Monetary System, they have 
increased monetary supply, leading to a loss of credibility in the fixed 
parity between the USD and gold. Moreover, countries with a persistent 
misalignment of their currencies (in particular, Japan and Germany 
presented a structural surplus in their balance of payments) were not 
always keen on appreciating their currency. In August 1971, Richard Nixon 
acknowledged that the US government could no longer guarantee 
the $35 per ounce parity, leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system. Since then, currencies have been free to float. 
At the same time, regional agreements have been signed to limit the 
fluctuations of the currencies. The most famous ones are the different 
agreements (Exchange rate mechanism, European Monetary system, 
and the Euro) among European countries. Looking at the classification 
proposed by the IMF, in May 2006,4 70 countries out of 187 presented a 
more or less fixed exchange rate system.
Let us come back to the symptoms of a financial crisis affecting the 
currency market. If the exchange rate is fixed, the occurrence of a finan-
cial crisis is easily detectable, since it coincides with the abandonment 
of the peg. To illustrate this characterization, Figure 2 represents the 
evolution of four different (nominal) exchange rates (Thai Baht, Russian 
Ruble, Brazilian Real, and Turkish Lira) vis à vis the USD. The period of the 
exchange rate peg is characterized by a linear evolution of the currency. 
In Thailand the crisis occurred at the end of 1997, and the local currency 
lost more than 50% of its value in USD. The depreciation, which followed 
the abandonment of the peg, was even higher for the Russian Ruble in 
August 1998, as it jumped from $5/RR to $25 some days after. Similar 
non-linear disruptions are also evident for the Brazilian Real in 1998 and 
the Turkish Lira in 2001. 
In the case of a floating exchange rate system, the detection of a 
crisis is much more difficult. Glick and Hutchinson (1999) define a crisis 
as “large changes in some indicators of actual or potential currency 
values,” but they do not provide an operational criterion to detect a 
crisis. For such a reason, several criteria - 25% depreciation in the nomi-
nal exchange rate, an increase in the real interest rate, etc.5 - have been 
used.
Another problem associated with the detection of a currency crisis 
is the inclusion of unsuccessful speculative attacks. It is indeed evident 
that a country can react to speculative pressure on its exchange rate 
by increasing its interest rate: in such a case, investments are attracted 
to the country, leading to an increase in the demand for local currency 
4 http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm
5 See Breitung and Candelon (2005) for a detailed discussion of these criteria.
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and appreciating the exchange rate. For this reason, Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz (1996) have proposed to build a currency pressure index 
composed of the exchange rate, the interest rate, and the reserves. 
Nevertheless, the optimal weighting of these three components is still 
debatable.
Banking crisis
Banking crises have become popular this year, with the near failure 
of Northern Rock and Bear Stearns and the decrease in the benefit of 
banks due to their potential loss of their real estate investments or the 
governance problem encountered by Société Générale. In fact, banking 
crises are inherent to the specificities of banking activities per se. To 
oversimplify again, banks are financial intermediaries that collect liqui-
dity from several sources and invest it in loans with different maturity. 
This maturity transformation is at the origin of two potentially serious 
problems. 
Figure 2:  
Nominal exchange rate vis à vis of the US Dollar 
(daily frequency extracted from DataStream)
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First, this transformation may lead to bank runs or panics “when a 
bank cannot honor its immediate contractual obligations to its creditors, 
even though its net value is positive. That is, it does not have funds to meet 
the withdrawal of deposits at a given point in time, although over time it 
would be able to do so” (Kumar, Masson, and Miller, 2000, p. 4). Typically, 
creditors do not think that their bank can immediately pay all of its 
deposits; they thus decide to rush in order to be the first to withdraw 
their deposit, hoping that—as in a queuing system—the first in will have 
a higher chance to be served. That is the reason long queues formed in 
front of the bank agencies of Northern Rock at the beginning of this year. 
Bank runs are, then, associated with liquidity shortage and with loss of 
creditor confidence in the banking system.
The second and more serious problem is the possible insolvency 
aspect of a banking crisis. Take, for example, the big crisis of the 30’s 
and the failure of the Austrian bank “Kredit-Anstalt” announced on May 
11, 1931, which ruled out the economic and political stability of Central 
Europe. Unfortunately, such examples are not infrequent (consider the 
1998 Russian crisis or the 2001 Turkish crisis).
 Nevertheless, using bank runs or bankruptcies as operational 
indicators of a banking crisis would result in detecting only very few 
cases. For example, in the case of Bear Stearns, there was neither a pro-
blem of liquidity nor one of insolvency, since it has been bought by J.P. 
Morgan. Therefore, the previous measure would fail to detect a banking 
crisis in such a case, and it sounds more accurate for an empirical or ope-
rational goal to set up a measure representing the fragility of the bank-
ing sector, the crisis being detected when this index crosses a certain 
threshold. The implementation of such a strategy requires a maximum 
of information to be contained in the bank’s balance sheet.6 Due to data 
limitation and the reluctance of banks to open their accounts, there 
is no consensus on the optimal set of variables that should be used. 
Nevertheless, all studies include a variable that represents the bank’s 
ability to correctly price the risks associated with their intermediate role. 
Detragiache and Demirguc-Kunt (1998) consider the ratio of nonperfor-
ming loans (loans that are in—or nearing—default) to total bank loans. 
If this ratio becomes too high, it indicates that the banking system is 
weak: a shock will cause a bank panic and the possible insolvency of the 
banking sector. Typically, in the beginning of the year, non-performing 
loans associated with real estate investments led to a higher fragility of 
the banking sector in the United States. 
It results from this index that almost all countries have suffered from 
a banking crisis since the end of the 1970’s (see Figure 3). Nevertheless, 
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it is noticeable that emerging countries are much more often subject to 
such episodes than developed ones. Typically, more than a dozen strong 
banking crises have occurred in developing countries (Venezuela, 1994; 
Mexico, 1995; Argentina, 1980-82; Chile, 1982-85; Côte d’Ivoire, 1988-91). 
This can be explained by the important financing role of the banking 
system when financial markets are not sufficiently mature. 
9
Banking Problems since Late 1970s
Systemic banking crises
No crises
Episodes of non-systemic banking crises
Insufficient informationSource: Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
6   Bruinshoofd, Candelon and Raabe (2008) consider, for example, 15 series extracted from 
the balance sheet of the bank as funds competition, trade competition, bank assets, private 
credit by banks, bank deposits, domestic credit by banks, overhead costs, net interest margin, 
claims on the private sector, claims on the government, bank liquid reserves, lending boom, 
foreign bank penetration, foreign assets price risk, loans to deposits and foreign funding.
Figure 3: 
Geographical localization of the episodes of banking crises since 
the late 1970’s.
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Debt crisis
A debt crisis typically occurs when a country is facing problems with 
the payment of the interest or the principal of its foreign debt. In other 
words, during a debt crisis, the country faces a liquidity problem like a 
part entière household. Nevertheless, it is much easier for a creditor to 
claim a payment from individuals than from a state. This principle of 
sovereign immunity, which has interested lawyers for years, has been 
at the origin of famous military interventions before World War I (such 
as the British, French and Spanish intervention in Mexico in 1859-1861 
and the U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1905 and in 
Nicaragua in 1911-12) and numerous scandals (such as the Bolshevik 
government’s refusal to guarantee Russian loans issued by the czarist 
government). Since the end of the Second World War, government debt 
has, most of the time, been subject to commercial laws (for example, 
in the United States the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) and 
often traded on specific sovereign bond markets, even if all risk of spolia-
tion has not disappeared, as the Russian crisis of 1998 showed.7 
Again, such a definition of debt crisis is much too vague and does 
not function as an operational tool to detect a debt crisis, even if it has 
the advantage of providing the reader with a better and more simplified 
understanding. Defining a debt crisis as a period of interest rate default 
for a specific country would detect only a few crises, as most of the coun-
tries facing such a problem renegotiate or postpone their debt. In practice, 
countries rarely announce that they are officially defaulting, since the con-
sequences for their credibility would be disastrous. According to Moody’s 
Investors Service (2003), only seven rated sovereign bond issuers would 
have defaulted on their foreign currency-denominated bonds since 1985, 
and all those defaults happened between 1998 and 2002. For example, the 
famous Mexican “crisis” in 1994–95 would not have been labeled a debt 
crisis, despite the substantial IMF assistance. 
Moreover, this definition does not take into account the development 
of sovereign bond markets, which occurred in the 90’s. It is relatively easy 
for a country facing debt-servicing difficulties to access this specific mar-
ket and to issue bonds to cover its liquidity problem. Nevertheless, a coun-
try with a high risk of default should reward investors with a consequent 
risk premium, leading to a higher interest rate. Again, the similarity with 
a household is straightforward: if you ask for a loan and show the bank 
that you have enough financial capacities to pay it back, the cost of the 
loan will be low. For such a reason, Pescatori and Sy (2007) use the bond 
7   The default of the government bond (GKO) occurred in August 1998. Foreign investors  
 then had the choice between receiving three.5% in cash, 6.5% in a 3-month period, and
 90% in new government bonds (OFZ) or 90% in new OFZ.
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spread between risky and less risky countries as an indicator of tension on 
the sovereign bond market. Once this spread crosses a certain threshold, 
a debt crisis is detected. Using this criterion, the number of crises jumps 
to 168 for the period 1975-1993! These findings are similar to those of the 
famous Standard and Poor’s classification. (See Table 1.) 
It is also possible to include macroeconomic variables in order to build 
a more informative index for debt crises. Intuitively, if a country expects an 
improvement in its macroeconomic activity (for example, higher output, 
more exports, and larger tax incomes), temporary payment problems do 
not necessarily induce a debt crisis.
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) decided to complete the informa-
tion set by including ex post variables such as the rescheduling or debt 
restructuring agreement with commercial creditors. Nevertheless, such 
series are only provided with delay (of several months) and thus only per-
mit an ex post detection of debt crises.
Table 1: 
Debt crisis dates. Extracted from Pescatori and Sy (2007), p. 321.
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It is obvious from this quick descriptive survey that the theoretical 
symptoms of financial crises are many and depend on the type of crisis 
(currency, banking or debt). Moreover, even if theoretical definitions are 
available and generally accepted, an unambiguous operational criterion, 
which could be used to detect the occurrence of a certain type of crises, 
is not available. It is interesting to note that, in this field, theory seems 
to still be ahead of practice.
Several types of crises, one example: the Russian cold 1998
Unfortunately, several types of crises could simultaneously hit a 
country during the same historical episode. Typically, a currency crisis 
can occur together with a banking crisis, creating a “twin crisis.” Of 
course, a debt crisis leading to the potential default of the country 
may also be associated with a twin crisis, leading to severe financial 
“disease”. The best way to illustrate this with an historical example, in 
my opinion, is with the Russian turmoil of 1998 (also labeled the Russian 
cold), which constitutes the best illustration of a global crisis associating 
banking, currency, and debt crises.
On October 27-28, 1997, the Russian stock exchange sharply collapsed. 
While less severe, the downward trend on the Russian shares continued 
at the beginning of November. Noticing the crunch in liquidity and the 
decrease in confidence of the foreign investors in Russia, the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin decided to inject liquidities from 
November 11 onward. In December, the World Bank provided a 1.6 bil-
lion USD loan to the Russian government. Despite these interventions, 
the crisis was not stopped, simply delayed. In March 1998, the famous 
agency rate company Moody’s downgrades the Russian long-term 
foreign currency debt. This signified that, despite public intervention, 
the crisis was still going on, and the risk of investing in Russia rose. 
Investors were asking for a higher risk premium, increasing thus the 
probability of country default. The debt crisis could then be detected. At 
the same time, the stock exchange reached its two-year minimum level, 
highlighting the severity of the crisis. Facing a potential severe turmoil 
and noticing the incapacity of the Prime Minister to cure the disease, 
President Yeltsin and the parliament decided to substitute Kiriyenko 
for Chernomyrdin on March 23, 1998. This decision did not structurally 
affect the situation as, in mid-July 1998, the IMF provided an emergency 
package of 22.7 Billion USD. It was then acknowledged that the situation 
became catastrophic and that the liquidities available were insufficient 
to curving down the crisis. On August 17, 1998, Russian authorities 
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announced the abandonment of the peg to the USD, leading to a quasi-
immediate depreciation of the Russian Ruble by 50%, signaling the 
occurrence of a currency crisis. The government suspended the payment 
of the government bonds (called GKO), indicating that Russia could 
not pay the service of its debt. The debt crisis was then acknowledged. 
Simultaneously, a 90-day moratorium on payment by Russian banks was 
announced in order to avoid the collapse of the entire Russian banking 
system. There was thus a great liquidity crunch in the Russian banking 
system, leading to the stigma of a banking crisis. 
It is therefore noticeable that, at the end of the summer of 1998, 
the patient Russia was affected by a serious cold associating the three 
types of crises previously described: currency, banking, and debt crises. 
The symptoms were so severe that the diagnosis of a financial crisis 
was unambiguous. Prime Minister Kyrienko appeared to be unable to 
provide an adequate cure, but the candidates for this position were not 
numerous. On August 23, Yeltsin decided to offer the interim position to 
Kyrienko’s predecessor, Chernomyrdin, in order to get enough time to 
find an adequate candidate.8 Almost ten years after the collapse of the 
Berlin’s wall, Russia faced a second earthquake, which was not political 
but economical. The Russian cold constitutes an adequate example of 
financial turmoil, for which any operational indicators would detect 
simultaneously a currency, a banking and a debt crisis. 
Even if the example of the Russian cold is interesting per se, one 
should nevertheless consider it to be specific to a country in transition 
or an emerging country. The probability that a similar event would occur 
in a developed country is low. Besides, the consequences for the real eco-
nomy turned out to be negligible ex post. Some detractors would then 
propose to focus on more stringent and structural economic problems 
such as inflation or unemployment.
Financial Crisis: a growing and more severe problem for the world  
 economies
To tackle this issue, Bordo et al. (2001) propose a deep historical 
analysis and investigate 1) whether financial crises have become more 
frequent in the recent years; 2) if yes, which type of crisis occurs more 
frequently (banking, currency or both)9; 3) whether they became more 
severe; and 4) whether they imply real activity loss. Several factors may 
explain why financial crises in general should have become much more 
frequent in the recent past. First, financial globalization (a decrease in 
transaction costs and the creation of new potential markets in emer-
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ging countries) has favored a better risk diversification, but at the same 
time, the mobility of capital increases, leading to a greater instability of 
financial markets. As is typical, after the rumors indicating that the Thai 
real estate market was over-estimated in 1997, risky investments were 
immediately withdrawn from Thailand to settle more mature markets. 
Similarly, the elaboration of such new financial products as complex 
credit derivatives and exotic credit hedges has led to dilution of risk. 
Many practitioners fallaciously conclude that the risk disappears, but 
instead it has been spread out among market participants, increasing 
the probability of a global financial crisis. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, economic education and information as well as regulation have 
been improved. Typically, regulation authorities have developed new 
tools to control for the risk taken by the banks and may intervene in 
cases of over-exposure of the whole banking system. At this stage, it is 
thus hard to say which factors are dominating. Bordo et al. (2001) con-
sider a large set of countries -21 (resp. 5610) for the periods before (resp. 
after) 1971- as well as four periods: 1880-1913 (characterized by the gold 
exchange standard), 1919-1930 (interwar period with several exchange 
rate systems), 1944-1971 (the Bretton Woods system) and 1973-1997 (the 
post-Bretton Woods period). They calculate the probability over each 
sub-period of a particular country facing a currency and/or a banking 
crisis.11
8   Primakov seceded to Chernomyrdin on September 11th.
9   Bordo et al. (2001) did not consider the case of a sovereign debt crisis. 
10   Emerging as well as new countries issuing from the decolonization process are then 
 included among these 56 countries.
11   The method used to date the crises is available in Bordo et al. (2001)
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Figure 4: 
From Bordo et al. (2001), p. 50
Figure 4 clearly reveals that the probability of financial crisis (whate-
ver the type of crisis and the sample of countries considered) has been 
higher after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system than before. It is 
nevertheless noticeable that this frequency is still lower than what it 
was during the interwar period. When using the restricted set of coun-
tries (excluding emerging ones), the frequency of banking crisis goes 
down, supporting the idea that banking regulations implemented at 
the national or international level (Basel agreement for Europe) impro-
ved the stability of the banking sector. On the other hand, the exchange 
rate volatility has increased (the speculative attack of the Italian Lira and 
the British Pound in 1992 or the Scandinavian crisis in 1990). This reve-
als that, whatever the criticisms that can be addressed to the Bretton 
Woods system, it guaranteed the stability on the foreign exchange mar-
kets, justifying ex-post the role of the International Monetary Fund.12 
The ex post probability of a twin crisis has thus strongly increased 
after 1971. The interpretation of this stylized fact is twofold: Either it 
 
12 It is noticeable that the frequency of a currency crisis under the gold exchange 
 standard was even higher.
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comes directly from the greater frequency in currency crisis, or it can be 
that, beyond the statistical argument, higher linkages have been created 
between the banking and the foreign exchange markets, leading to a 
greater transmission of one crisis to the other one. 
Finally, considering the largest set of countries (emerging, transitio-
nal and less developed countries) leads to a rise in the prevalence of 
all type of crises. This is why it is usually believed that a financial crisis 
is a problem exclusively for the less advanced economies in the world. 
This statement is only partly correct, as the frequency of occurrence of 
a crisis in developed countries is only slightly lower than in the other 
countries.13
 The relative increase in the frequency of financial crises may 
also trigger different patterns. If the crises are more frequent but less 
severe (because, for example, of an adequate intervention of the natio-
nal authorities and the International Monetary system), it would then 
be possible to conclude an improvement in financial stability. On the 
contrary, crises may have become stronger, confirming that the problem 
is getting more frequent and more severe. 
Pursuing their empirical investigation, Bordo et al. (2001) report the 
average duration of the crisis as well as the crisis depth, measured by 
the cumulative Gross Domestic Product loss during the turmoil.
Table 2: 
Extracted from Bordo et al. (2001).
It turns out that twin crises are always the most costly in terms of 
activity loss and duration, as they combine the effects on several mar-
kets. Table 2 also shows that the cost of a banking crisis for economic 
All countries 
1880-1913     1919-1939      1945-1971     
1973-1997  
21-nations 
1973-1997  
56-nations  
Average duration of  crises in years 
Currency Crisis 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 
Banking Crises 2.3 2.4 a 3.1 2.6 
Twin Crises 2.2 2.7 1.0 3.7 3.8 
All Crises 2.4 2.4 1.8 2.6 2.5 
Average crisis depth (cumulative GDP loss in %) 
Currency Crisis 8.3 14.2 5.2 3.8 5.9 
Banking Crises 8.4 10.5 a 7.0 6.2 
Twin Crises 14.5 15.8 1.7 15.7 18.6 
All Crises 9.8 13.4 5.2 7.8 8.3 
Notes: a indicates no crises 
13 It is even likely that a formal test would not reject the equality between 
 these frequencies.
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activity is larger than that of a currency crisis. Such a result can be jus-
tified by recent international economic theory, which proves that under 
capital control, currency crisis may not have a negative effect on activity. 
It is thus important for a regulatory institution to have this ranking in 
mind in order to intervene adequately.
 Concerning the recent evolution, Table 2 shows contrasting results 
concerning the length and the intensity. The average duration of crises, 
whatever their type, seems to be longer than that observed during the 
Bretton Woods and the interwar periods. In contrast, the average crisis 
depth remains in line with the 1945-1971 period (except for the twin 
crisis) but turns out to be much less than the one prevailing for the inter-
war period. Such a result tends to indicate that the leading characteristic 
of the recent crises is less strength than it is longer duration. 
The inclusion of emerging and transitional countries in the sample 
does not modify the conclusion in terms of crisis duration. On the con-
trary, the severity of the currency and the twin crisis becomes higher. This 
confirms the previous finding that avoiding currency crashes is of major 
importance for emerging countries.
More insight into the cost of a crisis in terms of real activity is given by 
Hutchinson and Noy (2006). Using an elaborated econometric model14 
for a sample of 24 emerging countries, they find that on average real 
output growth declines about 1.3% in the year a currency crisis takes 
place. The year after the recovery is slight but significant (around 0.3%). 
The recovery is complete two years after the event. Disentangling the 
different types of crises, they confirm the results of Bordo et al. (2001). 
In the case of a currency crisis, output growth is reduced by only 0.5% 
the year of the crisis and reaches its previous level one year after. The 
real impact of a crisis is much more important (a 4.1% fall in real output 
growth) and longer (the output stays depressed for the two years after 
the crisis) in the case of a banking crisis.15
Hutchinson and Noy (2006) also investigate the effects of financial 
crises on two other variables: the primary budget and inflation. They find 
that crises seem to have no significant direct effect on the public deficit, 
whereas they play an important role in inflation (currency and twin cri-
ses leading generally to an upward trend in current inflation, whereas a 
banking crisis puts a downward pressure on price movement). 
14 Formally, they consider a profit panel model.
15  This finding is confirmed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), who consider a larger panel 
 of 41 countries. They nevertheless show that the output cost of a banking crisis is  
 greater for sectors of activity more dependent on external finance. Furthermore, 
 the heterogeneity is much more important in developing countries. 
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In any case, it is obvious that tensions on financial markets affect 
output growth as well as the development path of emerging countries. 
We recognize that the consequences are limited in times and should not 
in principle modify the long-term path of the economies. Nevertheless, 
real effects of financial crises last several years (more than two years), 
affecting the business cycle evolution, and may have persistent conse-
quences for the development process of the poorest countries. It is thus 
necessary to propose an efficient treatment to cure this disease.
Financial Crisis model and a specific treatment to each type of crisis
As usual in medicine, the treatment applied to cure a disease 
depends on its underlying causes. Typically, whereas a sore throat cau-
sed by a virus just requires a good painkiller, local treatment and some 
patience, the same symptoms caused by bacteria should be treated 
more actively with, for example, antibiotics. In the case of financial cri-
ses, finding a treatment adequate and appropriate to the cause of the 
disease is also mandatory. 
For sake of simplicity and time, we will focus exclusively on cur-
rency and twin crises, even if similar analyses for banking crises (with, 
of course, specific determinants) are available.16
Crises due to bad fundamentals
The first type of currency crisis justifies the collapse of a fixed 
exchange rate as a consequence of incoherent macroeconomic policies. 
Flood and Garber (1984) stress the importance of the monetary growth 
in this process. Rationally increasing money growth can serve in sup-
porting the minimum wage and social advantage or creating monetary 
illusion (as inflation is a pure monetary phenomenon). When a central 
bank is issuing money at a constant rate, there is an outflow of reserves, 
leading to a deficit in the external position of the country (also called 
balance of payment). Speculators notice this evolution in the reserves, 
and they know at a certain time that these reserves will be exhausted. 
Just before the exhaustion, there is a discrete jump in reserves corres-
ponding to the currency crises. 
16 See Allen and Gale (1998) or Knutsen (2001).
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Unable to maintain the peg of the currency, the government is 
obliged to let the exchange rate float.17 Figure 5 represents this specu-
lative path.
Figure 5: 
Fundamental-based currency crisis
It is quite interesting to notice that this linear model succeeds in 
explaining the jump (pure non-linear adjustment) characterizing the 
speculative attack. It is also evident that the date of the currency crisis 
(z) depends on the initial stock of reserves (if it is very high, then the 
occurrence of the speculative attack is postponed) and the strength of 
the money growth (here it corresponds to the slope of the curve). This 
first generation model also stresses the importance of macroeconomic 
fundamentals in the determination of the exchange rate. If the fixed 
exchange rate is higher than the exchange rate, which should have 
prevailed given macroeconomic variables18 (here, the money growth 
variable), there is an inflow of foreign currency due to the greater com-
petitiveness of the economy. 
Reserves
Speculative
attack
Time
0
Z
17 In the case of floating exchange rate, there is no inflow or outflow of reserve as the  
 exchange rate evolution is clearing the external position of the country. 
18 It is generally called the shadow exchange rate.
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The crisis occurs when reserves are exhausted, that is, when the 
shadow exchange rate equals the fixed one. Figure 6 illustrates this 
mechanism.
Figure 6
Fundamental-based currency crisis
Such a model of currency crisis is “moral” in a sense. The message 
is clear: if a patient smokes, drinks alcohol, does not eat enough fruit 
and vegetables and does not practice any sport, he is likely to face 
serious health problems in the future. For an economy, if fundamental 
macroeconomic variables (money growth, inflation, public deficit) are 
not in line with the fixed value of the exchange rate, currency crisis is 
expected to occur almost surely in the future. Applied to the Russian 
crisis it is evident that the decrease in the price of oil has altered the 
Russian term of trade and limited the inflow of foreign reserves. The 
effect of the counter oil shock has been amplified by the huge industrial 
concentration of the country in the energy sector. Simultaneously, the 
huge public deficit caused by the transition process has also accelerated 
the collapse of the Russian Ruble, which could not keep its parity with 
the USD. Bad macroeconomic fundamentals seem then to partially 
explain the 1998 Russian cold.
Exchange
rate
S(t)
Time
S
Z
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The treatment in such a case is straightforward and aims at restoring 
virtuous macroeconomic fundamentals. The patient should stop smo-
king and drinking alcohol, change his eating habits, and participate in 
sports. The personal trainer for the economy is usually the IMF, which 
applies its famous “cure package”, consisting in curving down money 
supply (a decrease in minimum wage and social protection), limiting 
public deficit (cutting government spending and raising taxes) and 
liberalizing the rules for foreign investment and trade. The treatment is 
usually painful for the population and costly for welfare19  but usually 
suffices to stop the collapse of the currency.
Non-fundamental-based crises
Unfortunately, these models appear to be unable to explain recent 
currency turmoil. For example, the European exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) was wrecked by a severe crisis in 1991-1992. The biggest victims 
of the ERM crisis (the UK, Spain, and France) were not undermined by 
weak fundamentals or inadequate monetary policies. Moreover, the 
exhaustion in their international reserves should theoretically have been 
impossible. According to the European solidarity mechanisms (expres-
sed in particular in the Nyborg agreement in 1988), the central banks 
of the other European countries (in particular the Bundesbank) have 
to defend endangered currencies. The availability of foreign reserves is 
then unlimited, annihilating a priori any currency attack. Nevertheless, 
the speculative attack occurred, leading to a strong depreciation of these 
three currencies that crossed the fluctuation margins. This type of cur-
rency crisis concerns a healthy patient with virtuous behaviors (healthy, 
non-drinker, non-smoker, regular physical activity), who is nevertheless 
affected by the disease. What can be the causes behind these currency 
crises?
Second-generation models of crisis integrate several aspects of 
market psychology in order to develop a framework able to explain the 
occurrence of currency crisis in a healthy economy. Several origins are 
proposed. Let us first have a look at the 1992 ERM crisis in the United 
Kingdom. It is evident that the British government had imposed on 
itself an uncomfortable currency peg. The credibility of investors was 
then affected and the government had to increase the interest rates to 
incite foreign investors in holding assets denominated in the country’s 
currency. Nevertheless, this action worsened the real macroeconomic 
19 It is sometimes claimed that the negative effects of the treatment are worse than  
 the disease itself: high interest rates affecting country’s growth and thus 
 employment rates.
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situation (unemployment and growth) but also led to an increase in 
the number of speculators attacking the currency: The reaction of the 
British government constituted the clear signal that something was 
happening. A portion of the local/small investors reacted to this sig-
nal by selling their assets in local currency. The crisis, which had been 
virtual, then became real. Such a self-fulfilling mechanism highlights 
the importance of news or rumor (whether true or false) affecting the 
market sentiment. Whether the country’s policy is good or bad is, in this 
sense, irrelevant. 
Several other psychological mechanisms may also lead a rumor to 
launch a crisis. First, as information is asymmetric (that is, not the same 
for everyone), investors tend to have the same behavior amplifying 
all the movement on the markets. If the leader (the investor having a 
credible reputation) goes in one direction, all others will follow without 
thinking. As a result, all of them may go over a cliff. Their behavior is not 
based on economic fundamentals but may still be justified. First, follo-
wing Obstfeld (1994), it is possible to show that an investor who will not 
follow the masses will lose. Second, from a psychological point of view, it 
is more comfortable to justify a decision (correct or not) by arguing that 
all other people took it. An information cascade may also be observed. 
Typically, if a market analyst says that a particular country will face a 
problem, some people begin to believe it. Because some believe it, more 
and more people come to believe it. The information spreads over the 
market participants like an avalanche and cannot be stopped. It has 
been well documented that these phenomena occurred during the 
1992 ERM. In this episode, Soros played the role of the well-informed 
analyst who was predicting the collapse of the British pound. His pes-
simism spread across the markets, leading to a self-fulfilling crisis. 
Similarly, Boinet, Napolitano and Spagnolo (2002) find that self-fulfilling 
prophecies are likely to have played a large role in the devaluation of 
the Argentinean peso in 2002. In such a case, a treatment aiming at 
improving fundamentals would make no sense, since the fundamentals 
are already strong. On the contrary, authorities should be persuasive 
and clearly state that the crisis has no chance to be successful, and 
then wise investors should refrain from attacking the currency. This was 
exactly the reaction of British authorities in 1992. Unfortunately, it took 
some months before the British pound stabilized, stressing the impor-
tance of a coordinated reaction at the European or at the world level. 
Moral hazard may also constitute a potential origin of the crisis. 
Imagine that a new medicine would cure all the diseases caused by 
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cigarettes and alcohol. You would then notice an increase in these 
pathologies. If a country is sure to be saved in case of balance of payment 
problem, it could be then tempted to run bad macroeconomic policies, 
simply to satisfy its citizens.
The transmission of a crisis affecting a neighbor or a trade partner 
may also be at the root of a currency crisis, regardless of the economic 
fundamentals. The concept of contagion is taken directly from the 
medical field and indicates the transmission of a contagious disease. 
Unfortunately, the translation to an economic concept is not straightfor-
ward, as confirmed by the numerous definitions of contagion available 
on the World Bank’s website.20 Several authors, including Rigobon (1999) 
and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), define contagion as a significant and tem-
porary increase in cross-market linkages following a shock. Contagions 
can jump between markets, for instance, between the foreign exchange 
market and the stock market, as well as across countries. This concept 
of contagion is often called a “shift-contagion.” Imagine two patients, 
one affected by the flu. Their prior situations were entirely different: one 
weak, the other healthy. One day later, both are in the same state, lying 
in bed with fever. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) would conclude that the 
virus has been transmitted and thus there has been contagion. For these 
authors, contagion is simply the cross-country or cross-market transmis-
sion of shock, whether or not the linkages are reinforced. This definition 
of contagion is appealingly simple to implement. Nevertheless, it leads 
to several econometric and conceptual problems.
Varieties of econometric techniques have been used to measure shift 
contagions. An intuitive and widely-used technique has been to test 
whether the correlation between two markets was significantly higher 
during the period following the crisis than during the period preceding 
the crisis. For example, King and Wadhwani (1990) show that the cross-
market correlation between the U.S., U.K and Japan has significantly 
increased after the U.S. stock market crash in 1987. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1995) and Baig and Goldfajn (1998) use a similar approach to show the 
presence of shift-contagion after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the 
1997 Asian crisis. 
Nevertheless, this intuitive approach presents several shortcomings. 
First, correlation is a static, bivariate, and symmetric measure. It thus 
neglects the possible dynamic structure of the linkages and may in addi-
tion omit contributing variables. For example, if a shock in the Russian 
equity market is transmitted to the Mexican exchange market via the 
20 See http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/ 
 definitions.html
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Brazilian exchange market, the correlation will not detect contagion. 
This “third effect” has to be taken into account to provide a more pre-
cise measure of the transmission of the crisis.21 Secondly, correlation 
automatically increases during periods of high volatility and during 
periods of globalization. Hence, a significant increase in the correlation 
coefficient after a crisis may have nothing to do with contagion, but 
may instead signal an increase in interdependence. Several papers have 
tried to distinguish contagion from interdependence, assuming that 
contagion should lead to a more abrupt change in the correlation than 
interdependence.22 Nevertheless, such an identification remains far 
from straightforward, and future research should consolidate the previ-
ous approach. Third, Manner and Candelon (2008) show that when you 
consider a more general framework (for example, a non-linear model), 
correlation measure is biased and leads to an over-rejection of the con-
tagion hypothesis. For all these reasons, the evaluation of contagious 
effect after a crisis remains a hot and interesting domain for empirical 
research.
Conceptually, shift-contagion also presents some weaknesses. 
Masson (1999) noticed that the same virus might affect both patients 
without necessarily indicating a contagious effect. He proposes to file 
this case under “monsoonal effect.” Each Asian economy sees their acti-
vity reduced at the same time when a monsoon is severe. In such a case, 
it is not possible to conclude the presence of contagion. 
Moreover, the detection of an increase in correlation does not indi-
cate the channel through which the virus has been transmitted. It thus 
makes the optimal political reaction quite difficult to set up.
For such a reason, other authors prefer to identify the channels 
through which shocks are transmitted. The most important are the trade 
channel (Glick and Rose, 1999), the financial channel (van Rickenghem 
and Weder, 2001), similarities between economies (Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz, 1996), policy coordination or geographical proximity 
(Bayoumi et al, 2003). Unfortunately, empirical literature23 shows that 
these transmission channels are very unstable across crisis and time. 
It is thus impossible to define a general picture of the transmission 
channel. 
In the case of a contagious crisis, the treatment would consist of a 
temporary isolation of the economy. If financial flows constitute the 
21 See Breitung and Candelon (2008a) and (2008b) for econometric testing of multistep  
 causality.
22  See Candelon, Piplack and Straetmans (2008).
23 See in particular Bruinshoofd, Candelon and Raabe (2008).
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transmission channels, a strict capital control turns out to be an ade-
quate measure.24 However, if a crisis is transmitted via trade, the situa-
tion is more difficult to handle. It is indeed almost impossible to freeze 
trade from infected economies, especially when they are located in the 
same region of the world and when free trade agreements have been 
signed. Glick and Rose (1999) use this argument to attribute to crises a 
regional dimension. Nevertheless, with a higher degree of integration, it 
is evident that the contagion of a crisis will be quicker and impossible 
to control. For example, some studies support the idea that the Russian 
cold had its roots in Asia and contaminated Latin America (in particular 
Brazil). Such a disease constitutes the major fear for market analysts and 
a promising research topic.
The role of the banking sector.
However, neither the first- nor the second-generation model was able 
to fully explain recent problems like the Asian flu or the subprime crisis. 
Therefore, a third-generation model is needed to complete the picture. 
Several attempts have been made to construct such a model. The first 
models, like the one produced by McKinnon and Phill (1996), consider the 
banking system as the core of the crises and explain the more frequent 
occurrence of twin crises. 
Krugman (1999) synthesizes the idea under the concept of “moral-
hazard lending.” Stimulated by competition of fast growing economies 
or during expansion, banks are tempted to accept much riskier loans 
in order to keep their benefit. This results in a larger number of non-
performing loans and a higher composition of risky assets. Therefore, 
an apparently stable banking sector can be in reality fragile, ready to 
collapse after a negative rumor or simply at the end of the expansion 
phase of the cycle.25 
Another possible explanation for the underlying fragility of the bank-
ing sector lies in the adequate management of the maturity transforma-
tion by private banks. In order to increase their returns, banks transform 
short-run deposits into long-run credits, leading to the possibility of 
bank run (creditors who want to withdraw their deposits could not be 
satisfied by the banks). During the Asian flu epidemic, this problem was 
amplified by the fact that Asian central banks did not have sufficient cur-
rency reserves and were therefore unable to act as lenders of last resort 
to prevent a bank run (Chang and Velasco, 1998). 
24  This has been experimented with in Brazil in 1994 and Russia in 1998.
25 This is in fact what happened at the beginning of the subprime crisis. For theoretical models,  
 see Allen and Gale (1998).
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Third, the linkages between governments and the private banking 
sector can also be at the origin of the crisis. In the case of the Russian 
cold, the government used to finance its public deficit by issuing public 
bonds, as the Russian Central Bank was not authorized to issue money.26 
Private banks were somehow forced to buy these bonds, leading to an 
extreme fragility of their balance sheet. A small negative shock thus 
leads to the collapse of the system and the transformation of a banking 
crisis into a currency crisis.27 
Treatments associated with this type of crisis should be more struc-
turally oriented, since they affect the economy at the micro level. Higher 
and more efficient regulations of the banking sector (see the Basle 
II agreement) constitute an example of a treatment to cure a third-
generation crisis.
Unfortunately, it is often the case that the second or even the third 
generation of a crisis may explain a particular episode. Coming back to 
the 1998 Russian crisis, it is evident that the counter oil shock and the 
specialization of the economy in the energy sector led to bad macroeco-
nomic fundamentals: deficit in the balance of payment and degradation 
of the term of trade. At the same time, the important public deficits, 
necessary to speed up the transmission process, coupled with the 
uncontrolled emission of public bonds (GKO/OFZ)28 indicated a weak 
macroeconomic situation in Russia. It was also noticeable that the pri-
vate banking system was quite fragile: a huge buyer of the public bonds, 
not deregulated enough and dependent on foreign capital. At the same 
time, the recent Asian crisis has signaled investors that holding assets 
in emerging markets was not a 100% secure investment. Moreover, in 
order to cover their loss originating from this crisis, a huge part of the 
investors were ready to reshuffle their investment in favor of industri-
alized countries. All the conditions were gathered for the occurrence of 
a general disease after any shock. That is what happened in 1998. The 
cure consisted in a mixture of an austerity package (mainly cut in public 
expenditures), a reorganization of the private banking system (leading 
to a higher regulation) and an active intervention of the monetary aut-
horities (in particular to control the value of the public bonds).
26 The rationale behind this is the fight against inflation.
27 A similar explanation can be applied to the Turkish crisis in 2001.
28 The Central Bank of Russia was not authorized by the law to print money in order to   
 cover this public deficit. Such a decision was made in order to fight against inflation.
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Prevention and Health system
Early Warning System
As the origins of the crisis disease are set up, it could be worthwhile 
to create a bunch of indicators signaling in advance the probable occur-
rence of a currency crisis for a particular country. This Early Warning 
System would constitute the blood analysis of an economy, leading to a 
preventive and optimal reaction from the competent authorities. Doing 
so, we could imagine a more effective and less painful treatment of the 
disease. 
Early Warning Systems exploit advanced statistical models. The 
first idea, proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), consists 
in using a signaling approach. They consider a large set of indicators 
(relating the external position, the financial sector, the real sector, the 
institutional structure and the fiscal policy of a particular country), 
and when one or more of these indicators crosses a certain threshold, 
the model signals the probability of a future financial crisis. Berg and 
Pattillo (1998) show that a simple profit panel-based model strongly 
outperforms the signal approach and recommend the use of discrete 
choice techniques. More recently, Tudela (2005) and van den Berg (2008) 
prefer to use the properties of duration between two crises to build an 
Early Warning System. They show that their behaviors are superior to 
the existing models when the panel dimension is limited to countries 
exhibiting similar patterns.29
All these statistical models constitute relatively good leading indi-
cators of a crisis caused by bad fundamentals. They could even quite 
correctly indicate which weak fundamental(s) has to be improved in 
order to avoid or at least limit the severity of the crisis. For example, in 
retrospect, the Mexican tequila crisis could have been quite well fore-
casted one year before its occurrence using the duration approach of 
Tudela (2004). 
These models can also partially detect the possible contagion of a 
crisis from one country to another by exploiting the spatial dimension 
of the variable (see van den Berg, 2008). The whole problem consists in 
correctly modeling the distance between countries: Do bilateral trade, 
financial flows, or industry similarities constitute adequate proxies for 
modeling the transmission channel of a crisis? The debate remains open, 
since at this stage, it is not possible to integrate these three channels 
into a single model. Furthermore, Berg and Pattillo (1998) also show that 
29 See Van den Berg, Candelon and Urbain (2008).
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the optimal horizon of forecast, the delay between when the blood test 
detects the possibility of a future disease and the occurrence of the 
crisis itself, is around one year, which is either too long (to stimulate 
the market) or too short (to develop adequate structural policies). A 
sequence of models with different forecast horizons should be availa-
ble. Unfortunately, they tend to exhibit different statistical properties, 
leading to possible inconsistencies in the policy implemented.
 At the moment, Early Warning Systems do not appear to be able 
to correctly detect a crisis not caused by bad fundamentals or a shift-
contagion process (as self-fulfilling prophesies). Unfortunately, such 
types of crises turn out to become the most frequent and consequently 
the most interesting to be forecasted.    
 It is thus obvious that at this time, statistical methods do not 
provide a correct blood test for delivering a reliable leading indicator of 
impending financial crises. All the articles in the press or sensational 
declarations in the media signaling the future occurrence of a crisis 
are inconsistent ways to stress the markets and create a self-fulfilling 
crisis.    
Health System: Reorganizing the International Monetary System
Since Early Warning Systems are not in fact able to perfectly predict 
the occurrence of a financial crisis, the International Monetary System 
should be efficient and quick enough to isolate and cure the disease 
when it does happen. The International Monetary architecture appears 
to be quite complex; it can be separated into world, regional and natio-
nal levels. The most famous world institution, the IMF, aims at ensuring 
the stability and the smooth functioning of the International Monetary 
System and the exchange rate. While this second objective was pre-
dominant before the 70’s, in the recent years the IMF put its efforts 
towardstrengthening the international financial system and enhancing 
its effectiveness in preventing and resolving crises. Typically, the IMF has 
developed and offered to member states macro-prudential indicators 
similar to Early Warning Systems, aimed at preventing first-generation 
crises. In case of a crisis, IMF provides temporary loans and advice for 
curing the disease. 
The second world level institution is the World Bank. The core job 
of the World Bank has a structural dimension and consists in “helping 
developing countries and their people reach the goals by working with 
our partners to alleviate poverty. To do that we concentrate on building 
the climate for investment, jobs and sustainable growth, so that eco-
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nomies will grow, and by investing in and empowering poor people to 
participate in development.” Nevertheless, given the strong social conse-
quences of financial crises in developing countries, the World Bank also 
tries to strengthen architecture of the International Monetary System.  
The third and the oldest institution is the Bank of International 
Settlements, 30 which fosters international monetary and financial coo-
peration and serves as a bank for central banks. With the increase in the 
frequency of banking crises, its role for the prevention and management 
of such crises has been amplified. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, created in 1974 after the collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt 
and composed by the G10 central bankers is the key group within the BIS. 
It stimulates the convergence of banking regulation and ensures that all 
financial institutions are supervised by common principles. Typically, it 
is expected that a more efficient and stricter regulation of the financial 
system would prevent third-generation crises. At the regional level, the 
European Central Bank also has a word to say. In the middle of the sub-
prime crisis, ECB kept its right to increase or decrease liquidities on the 
market independent from the IMF or the Federal Reserve Bank. Similarly, 
the ECB’s role in terms of supervisory competence is not clearly defined. 
The ambiguous Article 105 preserves European countries’ sovereignty in 
terms of supervision, except if contagion and major crisis are expected.  
 Finally, at the national level, central banks may want to keep 
their prerogative in terms of crisis management. For example, the Bank 
of England, facing the possibility of a major crisis after the bankruptcy of 
Northern Rock, decided to act independently. 
 It is obvious, then, that these three levels of architecture are 
too complex and may sometimes lead to strong inefficiencies. In the 
case of the Russian crisis, the World Bank offered a 1.6 billion USD loan 
in December 1997, followed by a 22.7 billion USD loan by the IMF in July 
2008. A joint action would have surely been more efficient to cure the 
Russian cold. Similarly, the recent subprime crisis has shown that the 
individual intervention of some central bank (the FED in this case) is 
useless if there is no cooperation with other institutions. Typically, in 
a second-generation case, where market pessimism is involved, only a 
common reaction may restore the confidence of the markets. It would 
nevertheless be unfair to say that coordination does not exist at all. 
Some attempts at greater coordination have been proposed: ECB has an 
observer status within the board of directors of the IMF, the IMF council, 
and in September 1998, the Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC) 
30 It was founded in 1930.
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was created between the IMF and the World Bank. Recent responses 
to the subprime crisis have been coordinated across these institutions. 
Nevertheless, cooperation is still far from perfect. For instance, the Bank 
of England refused to join the last common intervention of the ECB and 
the FED.
Conclusion
 It is obvious that the “financial crisis” disease will remain a 
hot topic in the future. My objectives as a professor in International 
Monetary Economics would consist in participating in better preven-
tion, understanding and management of these diseases. 
 I have no doubt that new modeling techniques and more effi-
cient econometric techniques would help us to better isolate contagions 
of globalization and provide more stringent Early Warning Systems, and 
these would lead to a more efficient organization of the International 
Monetary structure. 
Words of thanks
Now that this lecture comes to an end, I would like to take this rare 
opportunity to thank all the persons who believe and help me in reach-
ing this position of Professor in International Monetary Economics at 
University Maastricht. 
Voorst een woord van dank aan het Faculteitsbestuur van de Faculteit 
der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit 
Maastricht voor mijn benoeming tot hoogleraar Internationale 
Monetaire Economie.
As I wrote it ten years ago in my PhD dissertation, I do not see research 
as an isolated monologue between a brain and a pen, but instead as a 
group emulation enriched by exchanges, criticisms and improvements. 
This idea, which goes far beyond the restricted professional area, is 
without any doubts inherited from my ancestors. Woodworkers and 
“Compagnons du Devoir”, they were beginning their career with a long 
“tour de France”, confronting their techniques with new ones, learning 
different cultures and using regional specificities as a strength and not 
a drawback. It is then not surprising that the beginning of my career 
looks like an initiatic travel, passing by the Université Paris I Panthéon 
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Sorbonne, Maastricht University, l’Université Catholique de Louvain and 
the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. I met at each stop wonderful people 
and discovered fascinating languages and cultures. 
Maastricht University has to this respect a particular place. Young 
French PhD student I arrived in the department of Quantitative Economics 
in February 1997 for a six month Human Capital Mobility grant from the 
European Commission. It was for me a revelation and I quickly realized 
that there would be no way back to Paris. I am thus very grateful to all 
the members of this department at this time and particularly to Franz 
Palm. 
Cher Franz,
Quand j’ai préparé ces remerciements je me suis rendu compte que 
ton nom apparaissait à toutes les étapes de ma carrière: depuis mon 
premier séjour à Maastricht, en passant par ma défense de thèse, mon 
séjour à Berlin, mon retour à Maastricht, jusqu’au comité d’évaluation 
pour cette chaire. Je tiens à te remercier pour la confiance que tu as pla-
cée en moi et te dire tout mon respect sur le plan professionnel et mon 
admiration pour ta simplicité et ton humilité.
Je suis ensuite parti pour Louvain-la-Neuve où Henri Sneessens a 
accepté de devenir mon directeur de thèse. Sans son aide ainsi que celle 
de Vincent Bodart et de Fati Shadmann-Meta, je n’aurai pas pu obtenir 
mon doctorat. J’ai pu aussi au cours de ce premier séjour en Belgique 
apprécier pleinement la vie estudiantine et aussi me rendre compte des 
possibles liens entre la recherche académique et le monde des affaires. 
My choice for the academic career was nevertheless confirmed dur-
ing my period at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. I realised how 
stimulating and fascinating life could be working in a group of top level 
researchers. I worked and learned a lot. I am thus very grateful to Helmut 
Lütkepohl and the other members of the Institüt für Statistics und 
Ökonometrie. I also benefited from the great moments I shared with my 
roommate Luis Alberiko Gil-Alana, from which result a strong friendship. 
I also would like to address special thanks to Jörg Breitung.
Lieber Jörg, 
Ich werde versuchen mich auf Deutsch zu äussern, eine Sprache die wir 
beide wissen sehr zu schätzen, und die ich einmal gesprochen habe. 
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Es ist mir schwierig dir meine Dankbarkeit auszudrücken. Du hast mir 
unglaublich viel geholfen als ich in Berlin war, sowohl in der professio-
nellen Sicht, als auch in das Persönliche. Es könnte neben einen Glass 
von Bier oder Wein, bei einem Abendessen, im Büro oder im Lac Leman 
sein, aber ich habe von deine geniale Ideen und Bemerkungen immer 
gelernt. Für mich sind deine Arbeitskapazität und deine Kreativität 
immer ein unerreichbares Vorbild gewesen. Ich bin stolz darauf dich 
einen Freund nennen zu können. Ich habe grosse Freude an unserer 
Zusammenarbeit, und ich bin der festen Zuversicht, dass sie auch in der 
Zukunft fortlaufen wird, beziehungsweise versrpreche ich dir, dass ich in 
der Zukunft schneller sein werde.
In 2001 kwam ik terug bij de afdeling economie van de Faculteit 
derEconomische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit 
Maastricht. Dankzij Clemens Kool en Joan Muysken voelde ik mij alsof 
ik was thuisgekomen in een nieuwe tak van familie die ik enkele jaren 
daarvoor had verlaten. Ik wil de huidige en de voormalige leden van de 
‘Money’ groep alsmede de leden van de ‘International knowledge-’ en de 
‘labor’ groep, met wie ik een sterke band heb, bedanken. Ik wil ook een 
word van dank aan Sylvia Beenen, Fleur Keune and Sylvana de Sanctis 
zeggen voor de bijzonder efficiënte en altijd plezierige secretariële 
ondersteuning en samenwerking.
I would also like to thank all my co-authors: Jaap Bos, Allard 
Bruinshoofd, Michel Beine, Jeroen van den Berg, Vincent Bodart, Jörg 
Breitung, Gilbert Colletaz, Gianluca Cubadda, Arnaud Dupuy, Claire 
Economidou, Luis Gil-Alana, Alain Hecq, Christophe Hurlin, Clemens 
Kool, Olivier Lohest, Helmut Lütkepohl, Hans Manner, Joan Muysken, Jan 
Piplack, Katharina Raabe, Stefan Straetmans, Sessi Tokpavi, Jean-Pierre 
Urbain, Tom van Veen, Willem Verschoor and Robert Vermeulen. I realize 
that the list is quite long but all of them have learned me a lot. To their 
side, doing research looses its constraining aspect and becomes a real 
pleasure, like testing a good wine between friends during a summer 
evening. 
Producing research constitutes one side of my life, but transmitting 
it is also a fascinating activity. Students can be provocative, even 
annoying, but after all they constitute a challenge, leading to improve 
and strengthen scientific reasoning and communication. This positive 
feedback is reinforced by the Problem Base Learning (PBL) system 
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implemented at Maastricht University. The teacher is no more a tape 
in front of an auditorium, but can interact with the students. I really 
benefit from it and would like to thank my former students as well as 
the promoters of the PBL system.
Some students have a special place for me, in stimulating, challenging 
and avoiding me to sleep some nights. I mean the PhD students: Jan 
Piplack, Jeroen van den Berg, Robert Vermeulen, Chico Blasques and 
Norbert Metiu. I owe them a lot and despite my grey hairs I feel young 
at their sides.
Chers parents,
Je voudrais vous remercier pour tout ce que vous m’avez apporté et 
sans quoi je ne serai pas ce que je suis aujourd’hui. En particulier, vous 
m’avez appris l’importance du travail, de la connaissance et de l’humilité. 
Je vous remercie aussi d’avoir respecté mon choix pour cette profession 
exigeante et par moment incertaine. Vous m’avez toujours soutenu dans 
les moments difficiles, même si je sais que vous auriez préféré que je tra-
vaille en France et peut-être dans un secteur d’activité moins aléatoire. 
Chère Anne, Chers Nathan et Erin,
 J’espère que ce discours vous a donné une idée plus précise du 
sujet des mes recherches et que maintenant vous connaissez la raison 
pour laquelle à certains moments j’ai la tête dans les nuages. Mais je 
tiens à vous dire que je redescendrai toujours sur terre, car vous êtes ce 
que j’aime par-dessus tout.
Ik heb gezegd 
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